Reluctance of a super power:  the role of the US in the scramble for territory in the South China Sea and the Arctic region by Frederieke, Dijkhuizen & Dijkhuizen, Frederieke
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
          Source: LSE US Centre
    
Reluctance of a super power:  
the role of the US in the scramble for territory in 
the South China Sea and the Arctic region 
 
Frederieke Dijkhuizen 
 
Thesis 
MA International Relations – Global Conflict in the Modern Era 
Universiteit Leiden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date:     21 December 2019 
Thesis supervisor:   Dr. Cusumano 
Second reader:   Dr. Gawthorpe 
Student number:   s2052423 
Student e-mail:   f.p.dijkhuizen@umail.leidenuniv.nl 
Word count:    15.620 
 
 
2 
Table of contents 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 4 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION .................................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 RELEVANCE ................................................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER ............................................................................................................................. 6 
2. METHODS ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 DATA COLLECTION ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1 SEA POWER AND THE US AS MARITIME NATION ................................................................................................... 9 
3.2 MILITARISATION OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ...................................................................................................... 10 
3.3 THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC .................................................................................................................... 12 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................................... 15 
4.1 JUSTIFICATION OF THE THEORIES .................................................................................................................... 15 
4.2 DEFENSIVE REALISM ................................................................................................................................... 15 
4.3 LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM .......................................................................................................................... 17 
4.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM ...................................................................................................................................... 18 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................................. 21 
5.1 THE MILITARISATION OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ................................................................................................ 21 
Policy ..................................................................................................................................................... 21 
Strategy documents ............................................................................................................................... 22 
Actions and statements.......................................................................................................................... 23 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 25 
5.2 THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC .................................................................................................................... 26 
Policy ..................................................................................................................................................... 27 
Strategic documents .............................................................................................................................. 28 
Arctic Council chairmanship ................................................................................................................... 31 
Actions and statements.......................................................................................................................... 31 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 31 
6. CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................. 33 
6.1 DEFENSIVE REALISM ................................................................................................................................... 33 
The militarisation of the SCS ................................................................................................................... 33 
The scramble for the Arctic .................................................................................................................... 34 
6.2 LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM .......................................................................................................................... 35 
The militarisation of the SCS ................................................................................................................... 35 
The scramble for the Arctic .................................................................................................................... 36 
6.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM ...................................................................................................................................... 36 
The militarisation of the SCS ................................................................................................................... 37 
The scramble for the Arctic .................................................................................................................... 37 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................ 38 
6.5 SYNTHETIC PERSPECTIVE: THEORETICAL COMPLEMENTARITY.................................................................................. 41 
7. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 42 
7.1 ANSWER TO THE RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................................................ 42 
7.2 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................ 42 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................... 44 
 
 
 
 
3 
List of tables 
TABLE 1. FINDINGS CONGRUENCE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 40 
 
List of figures 
FIGURE 1: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA WITH TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. ...................................................................... 12 
FIGURE 2: TERRITORIES IN THE ARCTIC REGION. ............................................................................................ 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
1. Introduction 
As long as mankind has known the concept of the nation state, states have been in 
disagreement over the possession and control of certain areas of sea, belonging to one state 
or the other. Ever since, these territorial disputes have been a source of conflict. Still today, 
economic, political and security interests lead to rising tensions in areas with disputed 
territories. To date, two of these hot areas are the South China Sea (SCS) and the waters of 
the Arctic region.  
The SCS is an area that has been troubled by territorial disputes for ages. Although 
multiple states lay claims on parts of the area, Chinese claims and activities stand out. In the 
past years, China has not only continued its, by the international society regarded unlawful, 
claims of waters, islands and reefs in the area, it has also started to build islands on which it 
engages in military activities. Fears are that China might limit the entrance to the SCS and 
constrain free navigation (Bouchat, 2014). Initially, the United States (US) was not keen on 
getting involved in the numerous disputes over territory and adopted a policy of refusing to 
comment on or participate in any of the clashes. Lately however, the US has expressed its 
disapproval of Chinese activities and it has transferred vessels to the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) states to contain the Chinese threat in the area (Yoon, 2015). Also, the 
US is patrolling the sea in cooperation with these states. Free access to the SCS is of high 
importance to the US, both economically as well as geopolitically (Bouchat, 2014), and it 
considers the respect for international law a national interest (Landler, 2010; Lajeunesse & 
Huebert, 2019). 
In addition to the SCS, the Arctic region too has been the scene of controversy for the states 
surrounding it (Birdwell, 2016). Due to the effects of climate change, the Arctic is now an 
area with ample opportunities and potential for the winning of natural resources (Conley & 
Kraut, 2011). Gas, oil, minerals and fish stocks that have been inaccessible for years, have 
now come within reach as a result of receding sea ice (Conley & Kraut, 2011). Moreover, 
melting ice sheets may open up new sea routes, which can drastically change the character 
of international trade (Conley & Kraut, 2011). Clearly, high economic and strategic interests 
are at stake in the changing polar region. These opportunities translate into a growing 
interest of a number of states to develop the Arctic and multiple states try to lay claim on 
the Arctic territories, resulting in several territorial disputes, in some of which the US is 
involved (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012; Birdwell, 2016). The effects of climate change have 
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made the Arctic Circle into a centre of geopolitics and territorial disputes with direct 
implications for US security. Despite these high stakes, the US has mostly lagged behind on 
other states.  
The position of the US in the disputes in these highly strategic areas is noteworthy. It 
raises the question why the hegemon of this current, unipolar world, does not take on a more 
active and assertive role. If it wants to maintain its unique position, why does it seem as is if it 
has been reluctant to address these possible threats to its position?  
 
1.1 Research question  
Both the SCS and the Arctic region are of significant economic and strategic interest to the US. 
Nonetheless, the US has not responded in an assertive manner to the developments. This is 
noteworthy, not only because of the US interests, but also because of the role the US normally 
claims. One may have expected that, as the sole superpower in the international order, the 
US would have acted more strongly. Consequently, it is worthwhile to study the US response 
in order to find explanations for its behaviour. Thus, the research question is formulated as 
follows: 
 
If the US wants to maintain its unique position, why has it been reluctant to address the 
Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the scramble for territory in the Arctic? 
 
To answer this research question, three different international relations theories are 
examined in order to assess their explanatory power. These theories are defensive realism, 
liberal institutionalism and constructivism. The method employed for this is congruence 
analysis. I apply process tracing for each case in order to examine US actions as well as US 
rhetoric in its responses to the events. The aim of this research is not to identify a ‘winning’ 
theory among those three that is best able to explain the American position, but rather to 
reveal explanatory strengths and weaknesses of each of the theories, using a synthetic 
perspective to reach a comprehensive explanation of the US role in the SCS and the Arctic.  
 
1.2 Relevance 
This study is socially relevant as it considers the scramble for territory in two areas of high 
strategic and economic relevance. Seas and sea lands that, in hands of certain powers, may 
contribute to maintaining or challenging the current world order. As Becker states, “the 
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oceans of the world at once separate and connect us” (2015, p. 131). More specifically, this 
study examines the role of the US in these situations, which has been the hegemon in a 
unipolar world for years and is until this day still the most powerful state on the international 
stage. Although other powers have been rising in the past years, it is valuable to consider and 
research the US position in these important and characterising areas. 
China is often said to pose a threat to the US, as due to its economic and following 
military rise, it may be able to challenge the US as the sole superpower in the international 
system (Turner, 2009). Moreover, according to the US government, the Asia-Pacific region is 
becoming increasingly important to global security and requires commitment of the US to 
ensure stability in the region (Department of the Navy, 2015). Thus, Chinese military activities 
in the strategically important SCS should be of concern to the US (Bouchat, 2014). 
Besides the SCS, the Arctic Circle is a region of high strategic importance too. The 
developments in this region may have an influence on international trade and geopolitics in 
the years to come, and thus accurate action of the states involved is required. Studying the 
reasons that compelled the US to react in particular ways to these two events is relevant 
because it may shine a light on future US responses in and to territorial disputes. Furthermore, 
this study is scientifically relevant as, on a more general level, it contributes to the scientific 
discussion on possibly passive behaviour of the hegemon in a more or less unipolar world. 
Finally, this study shows how theories can work complementarily when a single theory is not 
wholly satisfying. 
 
1.3 Structure of the paper 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I will discuss the methods and research 
design chosen for this study. The third section covers the relevant literature on the events in 
the SCS and the Arctic. Then, in section 4, three international relations theories that provide 
possible explanations for US behaviour are addressed. Chapter 5 kicks off my own research 
with an empirical analysis, followed by a congruence analysis in section 6. The paper ends with 
a concluding chapter in which the findings are discussed, and the research question is 
answered.  
 
 
 
7 
2. Methods 
This part of the paper elaborates on the design chosen to conduct my research, after which 
the data collection is discussed. 
 
2.1 Research design 
As previously stated, this study aims to answer the research question:  
 
If the US wants to maintain its unique position, why has it been reluctant to address the 
Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the scramble for territory in the Arctic? 
 
To execute this study, I conduct a qualitative comparative analysis to compare the cases of 
the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the SCS and the US position in the scramble 
for the Arctic, and for each case I apply congruence analysis. Congruence analysis allows me 
to see how the theories fit the events in either case as it “focuses on drawing inferences from 
the (non) congruence of concrete observations with predictions deduced from theories to the 
relevance of these theories” (Blatter & Blume 2008, from Sinkler, 2011, p. 13). In this study, 
defensive realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism will be tested against the two 
cases. Following the logic of Blatter & Haverland (2012), I examine whether my findings are in 
line with the theory, are contradictory to the theory or go beyond the expectations based on 
the theory for each expectation. Then, I apply a synthetic perspective to show that not one 
theory is able to explain American behaviour in the two cases. Rather, I argue that the 
different theories contain different factors relevant for a comprehensive explanation. By 
proving that theoretical logics are complementary, I aim to advance the theoretical debate on 
the causes of US behaviour in the SCS and the Arctic region. To be able to conduct this 
research, I first formulate expectations based on the theories used in this paper to predict 
what happens in the cases according to the specific theories. Then, I analyse the empirical 
evidence following the logic of these different theoretical models. Thirdly, I present a 
theoretical synthesis for the cases discussed in this paper.  This type of research fits within the 
idea of ‘analytic eclecticism’ as defined by Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, as it searches for 
“theoretical arguments that potentially speak to concrete issues of policy and practice” (2010, 
p. 412). Moreover, it touches upon complex, real-world situations and finally, it aims to 
capture different types of causal mechanisms (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). The structure of the 
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paper is based on the work of Andreas Kruck (2014), ‘Theorising the use of private military and 
security companies: a synthetic perspective’. 
Within the two case studies, I apply process tracing as to examine the sources of the 
US policy. As Collier states, process tracing is “the systematic examination of diagnostic 
evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator” (2011, p. 823). In other words, process tracing is a method used for within-case 
research that focusses on observable implications of theory, causal mechanisms and sequence 
and timing. Through process tracing, observable implications based on theory are identified 
and a causal chain of variables can be established that lead to the outcome that is being 
scrutinised within a specific timeframe. Process tracing fits my research as it considers the 
historical narrative and considers content and discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is defined 
by Loomba as: “discourse analysis ... makes it possible to trace connections between the 
visible and the hidden, the dominant and the marginalized, ideas and institutions. It allows us 
to see how power works through language, literature, culture and the institutions which 
regulate our everyday lives” (2005, p. 45). Thus, I analyse the US actions and US rhetoric in 
response to the events, which includes scrutinising documents and statements published by 
the US government in response to both the Chinese militarisation of the SCS and the 
developments in the Arctic Circle.   
 
2.2 Data collection 
Before collecting data, a timeframe for the two case studies should be set. For the SCS case, I 
start examining US behaviour from January 2013 onwards, after the Philippines instituted 
arbitral proceedings against China. For the Arctic case, I start examining US policy from 2 
August 2007 onwards, the date that Russia planted a flag on the seabed of the North Pole, as 
this is often seen as an important symbolic event in the scramble for the Arctic (Potts & 
Schofield, 2008).  For both cases, the timeframe lasts until the end of 2018, as to examine as 
much material as possible and thus to contribute to the validity of my arguments.  
To execute my research, I make use of both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources that I examine include statements of the American administration, speeches of 
government officials and other documents published by the US. Clearly, actions of other 
relevant, involved actors will have to be assessed too in order to obtain a complete image of 
the case studies.  Additionally, relevant literature may serve as secondary sources.  
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3. Literature review 
Abundant academic literature exists on the US as a naval power after the WWII when it took 
over that role from the UK. Also, in recent years numerous works on China as a rising sea 
power have been published. Moreover, articles address the tensions this may cause between 
the US and China and the consequences for the world order this may have. As for the Arctic 
situation, this development has received quite some attention from scholars, which is logical 
given its relevance for the world order and the potential the region possesses for those who 
may lay claim on it. According to existing theories, the US should be keen to reap the fruits of 
this region and would thus approach the situation with assertiveness. However, the US 
response to the Chinese militarisation of the SCS and the US position in the ongoing scramble 
for territory in the Arctic region are telling examples of the hegemon’s reluctance to interfere 
in naval disputes that may affect its position in the world order. Combining the militarisation 
of the SCS and the scramble for territory in the Arctic presents an interesting case that existing 
literature fails to address. This study aims to fill this gap in the research and to find a 
theoretical explanation for the lack of assertiveness of the US to these events. In this section, 
relevant literature on China’s militarisation of the SCS, the scramble for territory in the Arctic 
and the American response to these events is discussed. It sets the stage for my own research.  
 
3.1 Sea power and the US as maritime nation 
Due to it geography, the US is relatively safe from land invasion on the one hand, and highly 
dependent of the oceans for its economy on the other hand (Hoyt, 2007; Murphy & Yoshihara, 
2015). Following from this, safe navigation of the seas is indispensable. After the Spanish-
American war in 1898 and the decline of the British empire, the US has assumed global naval 
hegemony (Mead, 2002). This hegemony entails the possession of sea power, which 
constitutes the ability of a nation to make use of the seas and covers political, economic and 
military aspects (Levy & Thompson, 2010; Vego, 2008). In a narrower sense, naval power 
refers to a nation’s military power at sea (Vego, 2008). Through its sea power, the US is able 
to control sea lanes and shape the economic order of the world (Murphy & Yoshihara, 2015). 
In its position as the world’s leading maritime nation, the US considers it a task to “secure and 
share the benefits of the global commons” (Hoyt, 2007, p. 577). According to the US 
Department of the Navy (2015), the US performs five functions on the world’s seas: 
deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security and all domain access. Despite 
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technological development, the US remains a maritime nation and both for security as well as 
economic reasons, the oceans are of vital importance to the state (Hoyt, 2007).  
 
3.2 Militarisation of the South China Sea 
The SCS is one of the busiest sea lanes in the world (Gao, 1994; Rustandi, 2016). Its importance 
is illustrated by Robert Kaplan describing it as “the throat of global sea routes” (Kaplan as cited 
in Rustandi, 2016, p. 1). Not only are the waters extensively used for trade, they also harbour 
a large amount of natural resources such gas, oil and fish stocks. As a consequence of the 
significance of the waters, they have been subject to a number of territorial disputes among 
coastal states who each claim sovereignty over the SCS islands (Gao, 1994), earning it the label 
of ‘troubled waters’ (Rustandi, 2016). A visual depiction of these claims can be viewed in 
Figure 1. Apart from China, these states include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Taiwan and Vietnam (Rustandi, 2016). Claimant states could potentially get strategic control 
of important shipping lanes. In addition to this, claimant states are eager to exploit the oil and 
natural gas deposits present (Gao, 1994). It is not hard to image that the issues surrounding 
the SCS have broad implications for stability in the region, as well as maritime security and 
peace (Rustandi, 2016).  
Although land reclamation is nothing new in the SCS, China has been especially active 
with this lately, both in size, pace and nature of its projects (Department of Defense, 2015). 
China made its first territorial claim in 1951 (Rustandi, 2016; Yahuda, 2013) but since 2004, 
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has shown increased assertiveness in the 
SCS (Yahuda, 2013). Furthermore, through the construction of facilities on man-made islands, 
China caused tensions to rise, especially when word came out these reclamations are being 
militarised (Rustandi, 2016). China is the only state in the SCS to undertake these kind of 
reclamation activities (Rustandi, 2016). The reasons for China’s activities could be numerous, 
but Zhiguo Gao (1994) argues, although his work is not very recent, that Chinese assertiveness 
can be explained by the economic interests China has in the SCS, which is supported by 
Michael Yahuda (2013). 
The situation is further complicated by China’s ‘nine-dash line’ (NDL), a line that 
appears on Chinese maps and that covers nearly 80 percent of the SCS (McDevitt, 2014). 
Although the line was first used already in 1947, China now actively uses it as an argument for 
its entitlement to the territory and the resources that fall within the area of the NDL (McDevitt, 
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2014). The way China goes about in claiming territory is often referred to as ‘salami slicing 
tactics’: “it continues to take small, incremental steps that are not likely to provoke a military 
response from any of the other claimants, but over time gradually change the status-quo 
regarding disputed claims in its favour” (McDevitt, 2014, p. 33). By doing so, China gradually 
obtains greater control over areas in the SCS (Dolven, Elsea, Lawrence, O’Rourke & Rinehart, 
2015).  
Important in these disputes is the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS). This international agreement lays out the legal rights and responsibilities of states 
with regard to the world’s oceans (Conley & Kraut, 2011) and is sometimes referred to as 
“the constitution of the seas” (Hossain & Barala, 2017). Initially the US was hesitant to engage 
in the disputes surrounding the SCS, as is illustrated by Gao, who finds that the US position at 
his time of writing was that it “makes no judgment on the merits of the claims, wants freedom 
of navigation to be preserved, and supports a peaceful solution of disputes” (1994, p. 355). 
However, due to China’s increasing assertiveness and its militarisation of islands in the SCS, 
the US became more critical. If successful, China’s claims on the islands and waters would 
provide the state with significant leverage on the global stage (Murphy & Yoshihara, 2015). 
Free access to the SCS is of high importance to the US, both economically as well as 
geopolitically (Bouchat, 2014). It considers the respect for international law a national interest 
(Landler, 2010). It criticised the reclamation projects, as it considers these to be a destabilising 
activity (Rustandi, 2016). Moreover, it demands freedom of navigation (Rustandi, 2016) and 
transferred vessels to the ASEAN states to contain the Chinese threat in the area (Yoon, 2015). 
Also, the US is patrolling the sea in cooperation with ASEAN states.   
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Figure 1: The South China Sea with territorial claims. 
Source: Hoskin, Maritime Executive. 
 
3.3 The scramble for the Arctic 
Not only the SCS has been the centre of territorial disputes. For years, the Arctic region has 
been the scene of controversy for the states surrounding it (Birdwell, 2016). In this paper, 
the Arctic region is defined as the area north of the Arctic circle, which includes all territory, 
sea and ice sheets in the area. With a surface of more than 30 million square kilometres, the 
region encompasses one-sixth of the world’s landmass, and thus the importance of the 
Arctic is obvious. Secretary of State Pompeo phrased the situation in the region accurately: 
“do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with 
militarization and competing territorial claims? … I think the answers are pretty clear” (Shea 
& Palu, 2019). During the Cold War, the region was subject to the acts of the two 
superpowers, with strategic bombers and nuclear submarines crossing the polar region 
(Conley & Kraut, 2011). Today, the Arctic once again is a hot issue, albeit in a different way 
(Conley & Kraut, 2011). Due to the effects of climate change, the Arctic is now an area with 
ample opportunities and potential for the winning of natural resources (Conley & Kraut, 
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2011). Gas, oil, minerals and fish stocks that have been inaccessible for years, have now 
come within reach due to the receding sea ice (Conley & Kraut, 2011). Estimates are that a 
quarter of the world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves are to be found in the Arctic 
region (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012). Moreover, melting ice sheets imply that new sea routes 
can be pursued, which can drastically change the character of international trade (Conley & 
Kraut, 2011). The Northern Sea Route would be shortest route from Europe to East Asia 
(Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012). Clearly, high economic interests are at stake in the changing 
polar region.  
These opportunities translate into a growing interest of a number of states to 
develop the Arctic (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012). Besides economic gains, receding sea ice 
results in new maritime security issues, especially for the states surrounding the Arctic, as it 
is an important location for ballistic missiles, missile defence systems and strategic 
deterrence (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012). While the ice on the north pole diminishes, Arctic 
states try to lay claim on the Arctic territories (Birdwell, 2016). Additionally, not only the so-
called five Arctic states with territorial borders in the Arctic, being the US, Canada, Russia, 
Denmark and Norway, but also other states angle for access to the region (Hong, 2012). In 
the Arctic region, the UNCLOS has been used as a tool to lay claims on territories now that 
ice sheets are receding (Birdwell, 2016).  
Due to its Alaskan coastline, the US is considered an Arctic state. Where other states, 
both Arctic and non-Arctic, have been actively pursuing their interests, the US has mostly 
lagged behind (Huebert, 2009). Even China has declared itself to be a “near-Arctic state” 
(Shea & Palu, 2019). According to existing international law, only bordering Arctic states may 
exploit the region (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012). The lack of American interest in the Arctic 
is noteworthy, given the state’s interests in the region. These are not only economic, but 
also include strategic interests. Despite its apparent disinterest in the region, the US has 
been involved in a number of territorial disputes. Examples include the maritime boundary 
in the Beaufort Sea and the Dixon Entrance (Conley & Kraut, 2011). Of the five Arctic states, 
the US is the only one that has not yet ratified the UNCLOS (Konyshev & Sergunin, 2012). 
To deal with Arctic issues and to coordinate cooperation in the region, the Arctic Council 
was established in 1996. The Council convenes twice a year and consists of eight primary 
members, being the United States, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland), Norway, 
Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland (Conley & Kraut, 2011 Miller, 2016). Moreover, eleven 
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non-governmental organisations, twelve non-Artic states participate as observer members. 
Its work has mainly focused on science and generating knowledge. The council has proven 
rather incapable of addressing security matters given its limited mandate and a lack of 
regulatory authority (Huebert, 2009, Conley & Kraut, 2011).  
The effects of climate change have made the Arctic Circle into a centre of geopolitics 
and territorial disputes with direct implications for American security. Thus, it is worth 
comparing the Arctic to the situation on the other side of the world that may have 
implications for US national security, being the Chinese militarisation of the SCS.  
 
Figure 2: Territories in the Arctic region. 
Source: Repkina, Eurasian Business Briefing.  
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4. Theoretical framework 
This section discusses the three international relations theories that will be examined to 
explain the behaviour and attitude of the US. It starts with a justification for the three theories 
chosen. 
 
4.1 Justification of the theories 
The three theories selected for this study are defensive realism, liberal institutionalism and 
constructivism, which are the three mainstream, problem-solving theories in the field of 
international relations. According to Blatter & Haverland (2012), one should start a 
congruence analysis with the dominant theories in the field. Logically following from this is 
the choice for defensive realism as the first theory to be addressed. It is the largest stream 
within international relations and has a significant influence on both foreign policy as well as 
scholarly literature. Secondly, I discuss liberal institutionalism. This school of thought shares 
some of the notions of defensive realism but is notably more optimistic about the nature of 
states and the potential for interstate cooperation. Lastly, I address constructivism, which can 
be seen as a response to the flaws of defensive realism.  
 
4.2 Defensive realism 
After the end of the Cold War, many argued that structural realism was on the decline, since 
democracy was spreading across the globe and international institutions seemed to possess 
the capacity to influence and contain the behaviour of states (Mearsheimer, 2007). As General 
Colin Powell stated, he was “running out of enemies” (US News and World Report, as cited in 
Waltz, 2000, p. 29). This notion was proved to be untrue by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which 
caused structural realism to make a comeback as a popular stream of international relations. 
Structural realism consists of different strands, of which defensive realism is the most 
established one. Thus, this work focuses on defensive realism. 
Defensive realism views the international system as an anarchic self-help system in 
which states compete with one another to ensure their survival, or at least the prevention of 
loss of power (Mearsheimer, 2007). Within this system, it is a state’s military strength which 
determines its patterns of relations which other states in the system (Friedberg, 2005). This 
military strength is “a function of the tangible military assets that states possess, such as 
armoured divisions and nuclear weapons.” (2007, p. 72). Besides military power, Mearsheimer 
argues, “states have a second kind of power, latent power, which refers to the socio-economic 
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ingredients that go into building military power” (2007, p. 72). Defensive realists believe that 
a state’s power pursuance is limited by structural factors, and that it is unwise for a state to 
pursue hegemony. In the eyes of defensive realists, international politics is to a large extent 
power politics.  
 Important to defensive realism is the concept of the balance of threat. The theory of 
the balance of threat came from Stephen Walt (1985) and is based on the idea that states will 
form alliances with other, relatively weaker, states to counterbalance an existing threat from 
another state. It is contrary to the idea that states may ally with the threatening state, so-
called bandwagoning. It is different from the balance of power theory in the sense that it is 
not only about superior power of the stronger state, but rather about the threat that goes out 
from that power (Walt, 1985). In line with this theory, is the idea that maritime powers form 
a smaller threat to the territorial integrity to other states than do land-based powers (Levy & 
Thompson, 2010). The same proposition holds the other way around. Growing sea power may 
influence the relations between states and alter the balance of threat. With regard to 
territorial disputes, realists argue the following: territory may yield economic and strategic 
benefits for states, and as for all other behaviour of states, states engage in territorial disputes 
for selfish reasons (Forsberg, 1996). Power-political interests and favourable power relations 
may give rise to territorial disputes. However, defensive realists also argue that states may 
not wish to risk a possible escalation of conflict when actions of the other state are not 
perceived as a threat to their security and other interests or when this threat is not existential.  
Defensive realism considers the rise of China to be of utmost importance to the US (Friedman, 
2005). The interaction between the two states is determined by the power dynamics and 
resulting threat perceptions between the two states, and China’s power and behaviour is 
unfolding as a consequence of its economic growth. Given the strategic potential of the Arctic, 
realists would argue that this region is of high importance to the US. However, neither 
assumption explains the reluctance to intervene in the SCS conflict and the apparent initial 
lack of interest in the Arctic. Consequently, I formulate the following expectation:   
 
Expectation 1: the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the 
scramble for territory in the Arctic can be explained by the US perception that these events are 
not existential threats to US security.  
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In this expectation, ‘the US perception that these events are not existential threats to US 
security’ is the independent variable that influences the dependent variable ‘the US response 
to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the scramble for territory in the 
Arctic’. 
 
4.3 Liberal institutionalism 
Liberal institutionalism is based on the idea that institutions can support states to cooperate 
with one another (Grieco, 1988), and thus these institutions play an important role in 
international affairs (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). An institution is “an enduring and stable set 
of arrangements that regulates individual and/or group behaviour on the basis of established 
rules and procedures” (Heywood, 2000, p. 100). Central to liberal institutionalism, in contrast 
to realism, is the idea that institutions actually matter and that “they make a difference in the 
behaviour of states and in the nature of international politics” (Stein, 2008, p. 212). They make 
a difference because they not only reflect interests of states, but also “shape those interests 
and the practices of states” (Hellmann & Wolf, 1993, p. 6). However, these institutions only 
develop when states foresee benefits from cooperation and there are sufficient common 
interests (Keohane & Martin, 1995). According to liberal institutionalists, it is in the interest of 
states to adhere to international law (Jackson, Sørensen & Møller, 2016). Thus, liberal 
institutionalism has a more optimistic view on world affairs and international cooperation and 
is less focused on conflict between states. Conflict is not inevitable and “cooperation based 
on mutual interests will prevail” (Jackson et al., 2016, p. 98). In particular, this theory 
emphasises cooperation in economic issues and it considers non-aggression, human rights and 
peaceful relations to be of high importance in the international social structure (Weiss & 
Wilkinson, 2014). 
Nonetheless, liberal institutionalism recognises the realist assumption that this 
international cooperation is hampered by the anarchic structure of the international system 
(Grieco, 1988). Likewise, it considers states to be rational egoists (Keohane & Martin, 1995; 
Hellmann & Wolf, 1993). Where realists argue that territorial disputes are solved through 
power-politics, liberal institutionalists argue that disputes are solved through “negotiation, 
bargaining, adherence to international norms or law, and debates that promote problem 
solving” (De Castro, 2015, p. 74). Liberal institutionalism is relevant for security issues as it 
considers the information provision function that international institutions can have, which 
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can reduce fear member state’s experience towards one another (Keohane & Martin, 1995; 
Jackson et al., 2016).  
In this study, the adherence to the UNCLOS will be of particular importance, as this 
convention governs the legal rights and responsibilities of states with regard to the world’s 
oceans (Conley & Kraut, 2011). Moreover, common interests that states share influence their 
behaviour. These interests can for example include economic interdependency, security 
cooperation in one part of the world or another, or a shared aim to promote human rights. 
Following this discussion of liberal institutionalism, one can conclude that the US behaviour is 
dependent on the international institutions present in each case and the common interests 
that the US shares with the parties involved. Thus, I formulate the following expectation: 
  
Expectation 2: the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the 
scramble for territory in the Arctic can be explained by the impact of existing institutions and 
shared interests with the states involved. 
 
In this second expectation, ‘the impact of existing institutions and shared interests with the 
states involved’ is the independent variable that influences the dependent variable ‘the US 
response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the scramble for territory in 
the Arctic’. 
 
4.4 Constructivism 
Constructivism emerged in the US in the 1990s and provides alternative explanations for 
international relations concepts such as anarchy, the balance of power, state identities and 
possible changes in the system (Hopf, 1998). The theory is defined by Adler as “the view that 
the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction 
depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (1997, 
p. 322). Thus, all international relations between states are socially constructed and 
influenced by the interpretations states hold of one another, so called identities (Adler, 1997; 
Friedberg, 2005). Identities are important because they say something about a state’s 
preferences and actions (Hopf, 1998). According to constructivists, a state’s territory can be 
part of its identity, which in turn explains why states engage in territorial disputes (Forsberg, 
2010). Based on these socially constructed identities, states are able to derive some sort of 
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predictability in the behaviour of other states and of the international order (Hopf, 1998). 
Consequently, constructivism is different from realism in that it considers not only the 
material world, but also the subjective and intersubjective worlds, and how these interact in 
what constructivists call the ‘social construction of reality’ (Adler, 1997). Because of this, 
constructivism understands power differently from defensive realism (Hopf, 1998; Weiss & 
Wilkinson, 2014). According to constructivism, not only material power matters in world 
affairs, but also discursive power (Hopf, 1998). This is power that is embedded in social 
understandings and practices (Weiss & Wilkinson, 2014). Discursive power is required to 
produce the intersubjective meanings that constitute both the social structures in the 
international order as well as the actors involved in it (Hopf, 1998).  
How actors in international relations deal with the structures in the system is called strategic 
culture (Friedberg, 2005). It is a “distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding 
the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique 
protracted historical process” (Toje, 2009, p. 4). This body of beliefs happens to be persistent 
throughout time and indicates what behaviour to expect from actors (Toje, 2009).  
A last important concept in constructivism are norms. Norms constitute beliefs about 
behaviour of certain actors that is considered right or appropriate (Friedberg, 2005). These 
“shared ideas, expectations, and beliefs about appropriate behaviour are what give the world 
structure, order, and stability” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 894). Actors may adhere to 
these norms, or they may behave differently. If behaviour by a certain actor is not in line with 
what the community considered to be appropriate, we speak of norm-breaking behaviour 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). However, when the norm itself changes, we speak of a norm 
shift (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).  
All of the three subjective factors discussed – identities, strategic cultures and norms, 
are “strongly shaped by the prevailing interpretations of a society’s shared historical 
experiences” (Friedberg, 2005, p. 34). Based on these factors, one can predict state behaviour. 
In case of the US for the scramble for territory in both the SCS and the Arctic, I argue that 
three concepts are of particular importance. The first concept is the American identity as super 
power. Although this time knows a number of rising states, the US is still considered to be the 
current superpower. Secondly, the US strategic culture with regard to maritime issues has 
been heavily influenced by its perception to be the safe guarder of international maritime 
trade by protecting international waterways. Because of this duty, the US has historically been 
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concerned about situations where international maritime trade was threatened. A norm that 
is closely related to this is the norm of freedom of navigation. John Noyes defines this norm 
as “the right to send ships across the oceans unimpeded by other states, subject only to 
limited exceptions in a coastal state’s maritime zones and even more limited exceptions of het 
high seas” (2005, p. 11). The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines it as “all of the rights, 
freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, 
recognized under international law” (US Department of Defense, 2015, p. 2). This norm and 
the adherence to international law is central to US foreign policy (Noyes, 2005), as is clear 
from the discourse used in this field. Throughout the years, in both policy documents and 
speeches, the importance of freedom of navigation is stressed. 
 Then, why has the US not responded more strongly to the developments in both the 
SCS and the Arctic? From a constructivist point of view, I argue that the US behaviour as a sea 
power is influenced by the three factors addressed above. Given the importance of both 
regions for international trade and commerce, is it possible that the US is moving away from 
a strategic culture of safeguarding international waterways? I formulate the following 
expectation: 
 
Expectation 3: the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the 
scramble for territory in the Arctic can be explained by a changing strategic culture in which 
the US wishes to be less involved in protecting international waterways. 
 
In this expectation, the dependent variable ‘the US response to the Chinese militarisation of 
the South China Sea and the scramble for territory in the Arctic’ is influenced by the 
independent variable ‘a changing strategic culture in which the US wishes to be less involved 
in protecting international waterways’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
5. Empirical analysis 
This section addresses the policies, statements and actions of the US government in both the 
SCS and the Arctic region. Analysing these allows me to identify elements of the theories 
scrutinised in this study.  
 
5.1 The militarisation of the South China Sea 
As discussed before, the SCS is a heavily contested region, and neighbouring states depend on 
the US for its regional stability (Bouchat, 2014). Furthermore, in multiple policy documents 
the US claims to be the guardian of the global commons (Dantzler, 2016), although with the 
arrival of President Trump in the White House this may be less so the case now (Ikenberry, 
2017). Nevertheless, it is still worth considering Clarence Bouchat’s observation that precisely 
the dependency of Asian-Pacific states on the US “could make the South China Sea a 
convenient arena for a rising China to test US political will and dominance through increasingly 
assertive incidents to which the United States must respond to protect partner and American 
security and economic interests” (2014, p. 25). David Gombert (2013) compares the current 
situation in the SCS with the rivalry between Anglo-German forces in the beginning of the 20th 
century and American-Japanese relations after WWI, which both resulted in violence, despite 
the common Sino-American interests and cooperation in other waters. He finds that the 
regional dependency on the US to face Chinese claims complicates the situation and will 
contribute to growing rivalry in the years to come.  
 
Policy 
Unlike for the Arctic region, the US government has not produced specific policy documents 
on the SCS. Rather, the US policy is made up of policy statements in which the US position is 
laid out. These statements are based on the guidelines of international law, the stressing of 
diplomacy instead of coercion and the US wish to remain neutral in territorial disputes (Fravel, 
2014), although it somewhat let go of that last premise throughout the years. On the other 
hand, Washington maintains relations with some ‘strategic partners’ in the region which it 
provides with military support. Until 2012, the US supported the facilitation of dialogue among 
states in the region, and although it became less active in this field (Fravel, 2014), it is still a 
proponent of dialogue. In the last few years, Under President Trump, Washington seems to 
continue the policy laid out by the Obama administration (Cai, 2017; Valencia, 2017). 
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Strategy documents 
In the 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama mentions the following about China:  
“The scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to 
China’s military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving 
territorial disputes... American leadership will remain essential to shaping the region’s 
long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce 
through an open and transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and 
freedoms” (Office of the President of the United States, 2015, p. 24).  
Concerns about Chinese activities is for example expressed in the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime 
Security Strategy and in strategic documents of the US Navy, although language about 
concrete American action is absent. The discourse in the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security 
Strategy focuses on deterring conflict and the promotion of international law and standards. 
According to this document “US allies and partners are seeking US leadership and engagement 
in maritime Asia” (Department of Defense, 2015, p. 10), while it also states that it does not 
wish to take a position in the different maritime and territorial disputes that trouble the 
region, as long as these claims are based on international law.  
In the 2015 strategic document of the US Navy, when listing allies in the Pacific, China 
is not mentioned: “Based on shared strategic interests, the United States seeks to strengthen 
cooperation with long-standing allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region—Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand—and continues to cultivate 
partnerships with states such as Bangladesh, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Micronesia, 
Pakistan, Singapore, and Vietnam” (Department of the Navy, 2015, p. 3). A separate paragraph 
is dedicated to China, in which the challenges related to a more assertive China are laid out. 
Despite this, no concrete action other than ‘patrolling the SCS’ is mentioned in ‘A Cooperative 
Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower’ (CS21R) to halt the Chinese militarisation of that area.  
The importance of adherence to international law is reiterated in numerous US government 
documents and statements and is said to guide the US in ensuring peace and preventing 
conflict in the SCS (Bouchat, 2014). One could also argue that by publicly denouncing the 
Chinese activities and stressing the importance of freedom of navigation, the US aims to 
“solve” the situation peacefully.  
Also, in the National Security Strategy for 2015, a peaceful approach is stressed: “[The 
US] ...will continue to promote rules for responsible behaviour while making sure we have the 
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capability to assure access” (Office of the President of the United States, 2015, p. 12). In the 
National Military Strategy of that same year, the intention to enhance alliances with a number 
of states in the Pacific region is expressed (Dantzler, 2016).  
The 2017 National Security Strategy discusses China’s military activities and the direct 
consequences these have for the American access in the region. As part of the pillar ‘preserve 
peace through strength’, the strategy strongly condemns Chinese actions in the SCS: “Contrary 
to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others “(The 
White House, 2018, p. 25). Maintaining sovereignty of South Asian states is one of the priority 
actions of the strategy. The strategy pays ample attention to China, and portraits the country 
as a threat to the US position in the Indo-Pacific region, but it also contains opportunities for 
cooperation with China. In the accompanying National Defense Strategy, China is called a 
‘strategic’ competitor that seeks regional and global pre-eminence. In doing so, it is 
“undercutting its principles and rules of the road” (Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2). This 
competition requires additional investments to ensure US security and prosperity 
(Department of Defense, 2018). 
A red line throughout different strategic documents is the US presence in the region 
(for example, CS21R). For years, the US navy has maintained a near constant presence in the 
SCS (Dantzler, 2016). According to the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy published by the 
US DoD, US presence is a way to protect national interests and to deter any potential threats 
(Department of Defense, 2015). In CS21R, the Department of the Navy even talks about “that 
unique capability: presence” (Department of the Navy, 2015, p. i).  
 
Actions and statements  
Three things are clear from US statements: the US wishes to establish a rules-based order, 
adherence to international law is central and a non-coercive solution to conflicts is vital. 
Knowing this, in what way are the Chinese activities viewed by American government officials? 
Some have expressed “strong concerns about China’s land reclamation activities on the 
grounds that they are destabilizing and inconsistent with commitments China has made under 
the non-binding 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and have 
also asked China to halt the activities” (Dolven et al., 2015, p. 21). Chinese actions in the SCS 
since 2013 have led to US government statements that these are meant to strengthen Chinese 
maritime territorial claims (Dolven et al., 2015). In 2015, the Congressional Research Service 
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pointed out that these activities could have an impact on US policy in the region (Dolven et 
al., 2015). Clearly, some Chinese claims are not in line with international law. Nonetheless, the 
US seems to stick to statements as: “territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully, without 
coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force” (O’Rourke, 2014, p. 22). With regard to 
hard-power matters, the US has been concerned about the militarisation of the reclaimed 
islands. These concerns mostly relate to the ideas behind the Chinese activities, the powerplay 
in the Pacific and maritime freedoms in general (Morton, 2016). In 2015, the US Department 
of State claimed to take “effective and appropriate action” as a result of the militarisation 
(Shear, 2015). The question is however, how the US government responded to Chinese 
activities and what strategy was employed. Likewise, the US sent vessels to the SCS to patrol 
the waters. Moreover, the US has suggested that ASEAN countries engaged in joint patrols 
(Chen, 2015). In 2015, the US increased budgets for partner capacity building and security 
cooperation (Dolven, et al., 2015). In that same year, the US started to provide support to 
states in the region to enhance their maritime capabilities which include the provision of 
equipment and infrastructure support to Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia (Dolven et 
al., 2015).  
In a speech at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, then Secretary of Defense Carter justified American 
involvement in the SCS:  
“As a Pacific nation, a trading nation, and a member of the international community, 
the United States has every right to be involved and concerned. As it is central to the 
regional security architecture, ASEAN must be a part of this effort: the United States 
encourages ASEAN and China to conclude a Code of Conduct this year.  And America 
will support the right of claimants to pursue international legal arbitration and other 
peaceful means to resolve these disputes, just as we will oppose coercive tactics. 
Second, the United States will continue to protect freedom of navigation and overflight 
...  There should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever 
international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the world.” (Secretary of Defense 
Carter, 2015). 
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In that same year, in response to continued reclamation activities, the US executed a ‘Freedom 
of Navigation Operation’1 (FONOP) around one of the Chinese manmade islands (Dantzler, 
2016; Cai, 2017). According to Adam Lajeunesse and Rob Huebert these exercises present a 
strong political statement, as they are normally reserved for only the “highest priority 
maritime disputes” (2019, p. 226). Throughout Obama’s presidency, the US has stepped up 
this kind of operations, both on water and in the air (Lendon, 2019). Despite this, the Chinese 
too have increased their activities for claiming sovereignty over islands and reefs in the SCS in 
the same period (Cai, 2017). These include patrols of their Coast Guard and fishing boats, 
military support for activities in the region and large-scale military exercises (Penhong, 2017).  
The sceptical attitude of president Trump towards American involvement in the rest 
of the world leaves more room for uncertainty on the American course in the SCS (Kaplan, 
2018). In 2017 and 2018, US government officials denounced Chinese activities (Al Jazeera, 
2019). Secretary of State Rex Tillerson even told Congress that the current Chinese policy in 
the SCS “will bring us into conflict” (Valencia, 2017). On the other hand, Defense Secretary 
James Mattis stressed the focus on diplomatic means in American approach towards the SCS 
conflict (Xiaohui, 2018).  
Nevertheless, one should also recognise that there has been some cooperation in the 
Asia-Pacific between the US and China. For example, both states contributed to a Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which was later signed by 21 Pacific nations (Morton, 
2016). Katherine Morton (2016) also mentions the establishment of a mechanism to enhance 
strategic communications, meetings between high ranking military officials and “the fact that 
US and Chinese interests in safeguarding global maritime stability are increasingly aligned” 
(2016, p. 930), although this alignment is unlikely to be sufficient to offset the tensions in the 
SCS. 
 
Conclusion 
At his time of writing, Ronald O’Rourke (2014) finds that a coherent US strategy to respond to 
developments in the SCS is lacking and that a visible response to China’s salami slicing strategy 
is lacking. Dolven et al. (2014) agree with this and find that it is difficult to signal whether real 
actions are being taken by the US. 
                                                        
 
1 The Freedom of Navigation Program was established by the Carter administration in 1979 and aims to challenge 
‘excessive maritime claims’ of any state in the world in order to ensure freedom of navigation (Xiaohui, 2018).  
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When analysing the US policy towards the disputes in the SCS, one can signal a trend 
from language of de-escalation and the aim to prevent the use of force towards growing 
military involvement in the region. However, US military actions in return have been answered 
by Chinese military actions, China’s reclamation activities have not been halted and numerous 
territorial disputes have not been solved (Xiaohui, 2018). Thus, one can wonder why the US 
has not responded more assertively, and if it appears that its current course of action has been 
ineffective, why hasn’t the US chosen a different path? In a press report published in 2014, it 
seems as if the US has been asking itself the same questions. This report states that despite 
the attention the US has given to the region, Chinese expansion has continued as US efforts 
have only had limited effect (O’Rourke, 2014). The report recognizes that Washington has 
been focusing on the wrong areas, and it seems that the salami slicing tactics employed by the 
Chinese administration has not sufficiently raised concerned within the US government. As 
Gompert states, “US strategy toward China is fraught with dilemma” (2013, p. 83). It has to 
balance its relations with China in collaborating on the world stage, while at the same time 
protecting US interests in the SCS. Should it confront China in East Asia, with the risk of further 
pushing China to challenge the US or should it hope that Chinese activities in the SCS will not 
destabilise the region in order to avoid a confrontation (Gompert, 2013)? Moreover, it has to 
maintain its credibility as a security partner, which it will not be able to when its challenge 
against China is not effective (Xiaohui, 2018).  
 
5.2 The scramble for the Arctic 
Following the end of the Cold War, the Arctic lost its major geostrategic importance. However, 
the planting of the Russian national flag on the Arctic seabed once more turned the area into 
a hot topic. The planting of the flag on 2 August 2007 does not have any legal meaning but 
was a strong political statement to stress the Russian claim on that area nonetheless (Matz-
Lück, 2009). Immediately after the news came out, Canada condemned the act, who’s foreign 
minister stated that “this is not the 15th century” (Chivers, 2007). The response of the US was 
rather cool, simply stating that the flag has no legal effect (State Department Deputy Tom 
Casey to NBC News, 2007). This rather reluctant attitude is reflected in the policies of the US, 
and still to this day Washington is said to lag behind on other states in the ongoing race for 
the Arctic (Shea & Palu, 2019). Given the fact that the US is an Arctic state, is it not strange 
that an overarching national approach towards this economic and strategically relevant region 
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is published for the first time only in 2013? And, despite the strategies laid out by the 
administration, why is the US still lagging behind other Arctic states? 
 
Policy 
Following increased activity from other states, the US established a policy for the Arctic region 
in 2009 (Conley & Kraut, 2011). The so called ‘National Security Presidential Directive 
66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD 66/HSPD 25)’ contains policy on 
economic activities, scientific research, maritime cooperation as well as security issues such 
as governance and shelf and boundary issues and is the basis of the US approach towards the 
Arctic and activities in the region (Conley & Kraut, 2011).  
 The policy states to be consistent with international treaties and to respect 
international law, including UNCLOS. The reasons for the new policy are listed as follows: 
“altered national policies on homeland security and defense, the effects of climate change 
and increasing human activity in the Arctic region, the establishment and ongoing work of the 
Arctic Council, a growing awareness that the Arctic region is both fragile and rich in resources” 
(The White House, 2009, p. 2). The policy aims, among other objectives, to “meet national 
security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region” and to “strengthen 
institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations”. To secure its security interests, 
the directive states that “The United States … is prepared to operate either independently or 
in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests” (The White House, 2009, p. 2). 
It discusses hard-power capabilities, deterrence and the prevention of terrorist attacks. 
Moreover, freedom of the seas is mentioned as a top national priority. By implementing the 
policy, the US wishes to develop the necessary capabilities to protect American borders in the 
region, to protect maritime trade, ensure freedom of mobility for US vessels and aircrafts, 
project sovereign US maritime presence in the region and support the peaceful resolution of 
regional disputes (The White House, 2009). Regarding boundary issues, it says to act according 
to international law. Economic activities are to be carried out while accounting for the Arctic 
environment. A separate paragraph is dedicated to international governance, in which the 
important but limited mandate of the Arctic Council is stressed, and the Senate is urged to 
ratify the UNCLOS. The directive acknowledges that ratification of the Convention is vital for 
international recognition of American claims on its continental shelf. The ratification of 
UNCLOS has been a delicate matter in US politics, as some conservative senators continue to 
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be concerned about the impact of the Convention on national sovereignty, as power may be 
transferred to international authorities (Roston & Migliozzi, 2017; Hossain & Barala, 2017). 
Both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have supported ratification of the 
UNCLOS, but it has not been adopted to this date (Roston & Migliozzi, 2017). So far, the Trump 
administration has not pushed the Senate to move forward on this matter. The directive only 
briefly speaks of US leadership in the Arctic when the necessity to “assert a more active and 
influential national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power 
throughout the region” (The White House, 2009, p. 3) is mentioned. However, neither the role 
the US should take on in case of tensions or disputes in the region nor specific threats are 
addressed. These are discussed in a number of strategy documents published by the American 
government, which will be addressed in the following section. Worth noting is that this policy 
was published only after the EU published its Arctic strategy. The fact that this body, which is 
not an Arctic state and does not have observer status in the Arctic Council, published an Arctic 
strategy before the US created a comprehensive policy, is illustrative for the situation.  
   
Strategic documents 
In 2013, the White House published, for the first time, a separate document on the national 
strategy for the Arctic region. In the preface, then president Obama states that “The Arctic 
region is peaceful, stable, and free of conflict (The White House, 2013, p. i). The strategy is 
built on three pillars: advance US security interests, pursue responsible Arctic region 
stewardship and strengthen international cooperation (The White House, 2013; Altunkaya, 
2019). For all objectives and activities discussed in this strategic document, the importance of 
the role of international law is mentioned more than once. It also mentions the US aim of 
peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion. To achieve the three priorities set out in the 
strategy, the US will depend on “a combination of independent action, bilateral initiatives and 
multilateral cooperation” (The White House, 2013, p. 6). It does not speak about any territorial 
claim or dispute in the Arctic region. In the 2014 implementation report following this 
strategy, US commitment to cooperate with the international community is once more 
stressed, despite an extensive chapter on the development of hard-power capabilities such as 
the development of Arctic communication infrastructure and maritime operations. Initiatives 
such as the establishment of the Arctic Executive Steering Committee following the Executive 
Order on Enhancing Coordination of National Effort in the Arctic were exetuced (Executive 
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Office of the President of the United States, 2015). This Committee aims “to provide guidance 
to executive departments and agencies and enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies 
across agencies and offices (Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Council on 
Environmental Quality, the Domestic Policy Council and the NSC)” (President, 2015, p. 4191). 
Also, a US Special Representative for the Arctic region was appointed. Additionally, the US 
considers having executed the strategy in accordance with the UNCLOS while ensuring its 
interests related to freedom of navigation. In 2016, a new implementation framework for the 
strategy was published which is based on a “commitment to leadership in adapting to 
changing Arctic conditions” (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2016, p. 
3). 
 In 2013, the US DoD published an Arctic strategy too. This document acknowledges the 
importance of the Arctic to the international security environment of the 21st century 
(Department of Defense, 2013). It is optimistic in the sense that is considers a “relatively low 
level of military threat in a region bounded by nation states that have not only publicly 
committed to working within a common framework of international law and diplomatic 
engagement but have also demonstrated the ability and commitment to do so” (Department 
of Defense, 2013, p. 4). This statement refers to the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration in which the 
five Arctic states commit themselves to the settlement of territorial disputes following the 
guidelines of the UNCLOS. According to Conley & Kraut (2011), this illustrated the nations’ 
intention to maintain the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation. The last section of the 
document covers challenges and risks to the American strategic approach, and specifically 
mentions that “political rhetoric and press reporting about boundary disputes and 
competition for resources may inflame regional tensions” (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 
13). It furthermore touches upon the risk of an ‘arms race mentality’ when guarding against 
future security threats militarily. To mitigate this risk, the DoD aims to build upon collaborative 
security approaches and transparency about its military activities. In 2016, an update of the 
2013 DoD Arctic strategy was published, with increased attention for freedom of the seas in 
the Arctic, deterrence, US forces to defend the homeland and for exercising sovereignty 
(Department of Defense, 2016). It is in this document that disputes with other states are first 
explicitly mentioned in official US policy. It states that the US disagrees with territorial claims 
made by Canada and Russia, as these are not in line with international law (Department of 
Defense, 2016). Moreover, where the 2013 report concluded relatively little threat to be 
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present, the 2016 version states that “threats in the North are evolving” (Department of 
Defense, 2016, p. 15) and plans for enhancing capabilities and training in the Arctic are 
discussed. A second update on the strategy was published in 2019. The central strategic aims 
are building strategic awareness, enhancing Arctic operations and strengthening the rules-
based order in the Arctic (Department of Defense, 2019). Its structure and content are 
comparable to the previous strategies published. However, the 2019 strategy is more explicit 
on threats and strategic development in the Arctic than were previous documents: 
“The network of U.S. allies and partners with shared national interests in this rules-
based order is the United States’ greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region, and 
thus the cornerstone of DoD’s Arctic strategy. DoD cooperation with Arctic allies and 
partners strengthens our shared approach to regional security and helps deter strategic 
competitors from seeking to unilaterally change the existing rules-based order.” 
(Department of Defense, 2019, p. 2).  
From the DoD’s strategy it is clear that the US views Russia as its greatest threat in the Arctic 
region and it recognizes that both Russian and Chinese activities in the Arctic may pose a 
threat to the American homeland. According to the DoD, both are challenging the rules-based 
order in the Arctic by undermining international law (Department of Defense, 2019). Based 
on its analysis, the DoD puts forward three objectives: defending the homeland, competing 
when necessary to maintain favourable regional balances of power and ensuring common 
domains remain free and open (Department of Defense, 2019).  
 Apart from the DoD, the US coast guard published a 10-year Arctic strategy in 2013. 
This CS21R discusses the Arctic too, but only briefly addresses the enhanced maritime activity 
that will result from the changing climate in the region (Department of the Navy, 2015).  It 
furthermore stresses the need for cooperation to ensure regional security and required 
enhanced American capabilities. Nonetheless, in general, Geoffrey Till (2015) finds that the 
strategy puts more emphasis on hard-power capabilities and reasoning that did its 
predecessor. This, combined with the fact that the strategy has been published in a number 
of different languages, including Mandarin, may imply that the US is flexing in muscle when it 
comes to seapower. Both the 2015 and 2017 version of the US National Security Strategy have 
little attention for Arctic region, which can be explained by the separate strategy documents 
published on the region. The US is not alone in its Arctic strategy. The other four littoral Arctic 
nations have published strategy documents too, all focusing on “on a peaceful and prosperous 
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region, international cooperation, environmental protection, and scientific research” (Miller, 
2016, p. 2). 
 
Arctic Council chairmanship 
In April 2015 the US assumed the two-year rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Main 
points of focus during its time as chair of the Council were the improvement of economic and 
living conditions of Arctic communities, Arctic ocean safety, security and stewardship and 
lastly the impacts of climate change on the region (US Department of State, n.d.).  As particular 
successes of the US during its chairmanship, Hossain and Barala (2017) mention the conclusion 
of the third legally binding agreement of the Arctic Council and the development made on 
Arctic maritime cooperation. Under US leadership, the Council defined specific challenges and 
identified mechanisms to address them.  
 
Actions and statements 
Konyshev & Sergunin (2012) find that throughout the years, American military presence has 
expanded throughout the years, similar to other states’ presence. This fits the US 
acknowledgement of the importance of the Arctic for the international security environment. 
In 2015, Obama became the first sitting president to visit Alaska (Hossain & Barala, 2017), 
illustrating the enhanced attention the administration had gained for the Arctic region. In 
2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer made clear the Navy was playing with the idea 
to engage in FONOPs in the Arctic, similar to the SCS (Lajeunesse & Huebert, 2019). This is in 
line with statements by Secretary of State Pompeo, who, in a speech during a visit to Finland, 
departs from previous courses by stating that “America could do more” (2019) in the Arctic 
and expresses the administration’s intention to uphold international law and respond to 
Russia’s destabilising activities. Furthermore, he takes a clear stance on Chinese involvement 
in the region: “… the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. There are 
only Arctic States and Non-Arctic States. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise 
entitles China to exactly nothing” (2019).  
 
Conclusion 
US Arctic policy has developed throughout the years. While it first lacked a cohesive strategy 
and command authority in the region (Robbin, 2011), it later developed specific Arctic 
strategies and created bodies to oversee them. The Arctic gained importance throughout 
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Obama’s presidency, although some components of it seem to be discontinued under 
President Trump (Altunkaya, 2019). Nonetheless, the US has been less active in the region 
than other Arctic states. Still in 2017, Russia’s Arctic infrastructural supremacy was 
indisputable (Hossain & Barala, 2017). According to Colonel Joseph Miller, Washington has a 
number of steps to take to ensure an efficient Arctic policy to guarantee “U.S. access to the 
strategic Arctic area and its resources, contribute to US energy independence, and ensure 
peace in the region with partnerships favourable to U.S. national interests” (2016, p. 3).  
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6. Congruence analysis 
In this section the findings of the empirical analysis are connected to the theories as discussed 
in chapter 4. Their explanatory weaknesses and strengths will be assessed, and a synthetic 
perspective is presented at the end of the chapter. 
 
6.1 Defensive realism 
The expectation formulated to test the explanatory power of defensive realism is:  
 
Expectation 1: the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the 
scramble for territory in the Arctic can be explained by the US perception that these events are 
not existential threats to US security.  
 
The militarisation of the SCS 
The presence of the US in the SCS makes for a special case: the US has near-constant presence 
in the SCS, is important to the regional balance of power and exerts FONOPs. Still, it seems 
unable to contain Chinese activities. A relevant question is thus, why has the US not been 
successful in this? Has it failed to halt China or was this never the intention because it does 
not view the Chinese activities as existential threats? Or, as Forsberg (1996) argues, may the 
current power relations be not favourable enough for the US to engage in a hard-power 
territorial dispute to defend its strategic and economic interests? As is clear from the empirical 
analysis in the previous chapter, the US views China with growing suspicion as years pass by. 
In strategic documents and statements, Chinese activities in the SCS are increasingly described 
as a threat to American interests, and language of de-escalation is slowly exchanged for 
stronger military presence. In a 2019 Report to Congress the DoD addresses its “eroding 
competitive edge against China and Russia” (2019, p. 2), and states that “developing a more 
lethal, resilient, agile, and ready Joint Force will ensure that our military sustains its 
competitive advantages” (2019, p. 2), from which a possible threat from the Chinese rise is 
clear. Nonetheless, earlier on the US chose a path of de-escalation to ‘solve’ the situation and 
created a network of strategic partners. From its FONOPs in the years of the Obama 
presidency one could conclude that these norms are more important to the US than its hard-
power, hegemonic position in the region. Chinese activities have not ended and Beijing’s 
“peacefully coercive” salami slicing tactics seem to be successful (McDevitt, 2014). It appears 
that Washington is not willing to risk an escalation of the conflict to ensure the continuation 
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of its regional position. This troubled US position can be explained by the fact that China is 
never going to accept American sea denial (Gompert, 2013), and thus a more assertive US 
position to defend its position in the region may lead to a military confrontation. Nonetheless, 
Gompert argues that the opposite is equally true, and that “assured access of US shipping and 
naval forces to East Asian waters is as important as it has ever been” (2013, p. 5). If that 
assumption is true, the findings by Morton should be troubling to the US. He notes that “the 
Chinese leadership is predominantly concerned with achieving hegemony in the South China 
Sea at any cost” (2016, p. 910), at odds with the rules-based order the US is so eager to sustain.  
 
The scramble for the Arctic 
Does the US perceive the developments in the Arctic as a threat to the existing balance of 
power? In the documents and statements analysed in this study, the US government more 
than once expresses the increasing security threat following from, mostly Russian, activities 
in the region. Although most of the capabilities Russia is developing in the Arctic are defensive, 
they should be viewed from a broader context with the events in Crimea in mind (Pezard, 
2018). As for the SCS, one can identify a trend of stronger language related to threats in the 
Arctic region throughout the years, although the language used is less concrete in the latter 
case. Significant parts of its strategic documents on the Arctic are dedicated to topics that can 
be related to defensive realism, such as preparation for increased activity in the maritime 
domain, development of aviation requirements and enhancement of domain awareness. The 
DoD’s Arctic strategy explicitly states that both China and Russia “are also pursuing activities 
and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to the homeland” (2019, p. 6), from which 
a perceived threat is clear. However, does the US consider this threat strong enough to 
challenge the balance of power? The fact that it is trying to build up its forces in the Arctic also 
points towards a growing threat perception, illustrated by the DoD’s expressed need for 
“developing a more lethal, resilient, agile, and ready Joint Force will ensure that our military 
sustains its competitive advantages” in areas of strategic competition (2019, p. 2). However, 
experts are still critical on the US Arctic strategy and find that the US “should develop a 
comprehensive strategy for advancing these interests” (Altunkaya, 2019, p. 184). Moreover, 
inter-state cooperation through international institutions and the importance of a rules-based 
order is at the centre of the US Arctic policy, and this cannot be explained by defensive realism. 
As the US has lagged behind and has acted so much later than other Arctic and even non-
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Arctic states, and has still not formulated a comprehensive strategy, I conclude that the US 
does not consider the developments in the Arctic as an actual threat to the existing balance 
of power.  
 
6.2 Liberal institutionalism 
The expectation formulated based on liberal institutionalism is:  
 
Expectation 2: the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the 
scramble for territory in the Arctic can be explained by the impact of existing institutions and 
shared interests with the states involved. 
 
The militarisation of the SCS 
In the SCS, competing interests between China and the US are present. China wishes to claim 
sea lanes and exploit the resources and fish reserves. The US on the other hand, is heavily 
dependent on free navigation in the SCS for its economy and the defence of strategic interests. 
With its aggressive behaviour, China shows it has a different interpretation of international 
law (Pezard, 2018) and to a large part of the of the US administration, China present an 
obstacle to the rule-based order in the SCS (Cai, 2017). Morton (2016) supports this view, 
stating that the Chinese narrative focusses on achieving SCS hegemony ‘at any cost’ and a 
reluctant stance towards third-party adjudication. Nonetheless, some cooperation has taken 
place throughout the years (Morton, 2016). Furthermore, outside of the SCS the shared 
interests of the US and China and mutual dependence and interconnectedness are not hard 
to think of. Despite rising tensions in the SCS and disputes over sea lanes and reclamation 
activities, the two states have other affairs to deal with on the international stage in which 
they are dependent on one another. According to Michael McDevitt (2014), this broader 
context is the reason that the US wishes to prevent the SCS from becoming the defining 
strategic element in the bilateral relation. In contrast to this, Su Xiaohui (2018) finds that the 
US is likely to give presence to its interests in the SCS instead of trying to obtain Chinese 
support for some its other interests. However, from this analysis I find that that is not the case.   
To conclude, the US seems reluctant to enforce adherence to international law in the 
SCS.  Interesting for both the SCS and the Arctic is the fact that the US is one of the only states 
that has not ratified the UNCLOS. Thus, it talks about adherence to international law without 
having adopted the law itself. Does the fact that the US still hasn’t adopted this piece of 
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legislation mean that there a clash between what it claims and its actual behaviour? Already 
in 2009, the US Arctic policy finds that ratification of the Convention “will give the United 
States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and 
interpreted” (The White House, 2009, p. 4), and still this has not happened.  
 
The scramble for the Arctic 
As discussed earlier, the national strategy for the Arctic contains realist components. 
However, some parts can be related to liberal institutionalism. In line with the expectation, 
the US uses the Arctic Council to push forward its interests, although it considers it to have a 
limited mandate. Likewise, international cooperation is important for the US: “the network of 
U.S. allies and partners with shared national interests in this rules-based order is the United 
States’ greatest strategic advantage in the Arctic region, and thus the cornerstone of DoD’s 
Arctic strategy” (Department of Defense, 2019, p. 2). Yet, one could argue that some of these 
interests of states may also be competing, such as the exploitation of minerals and resources 
below the seabed. However, liberal institutionalism is not able to explain why the US has not 
been more assertive in pursuing these competing interests as the theory would expect the US 
to exploit economic opportunities, like those that are present in the Arctic region. Similar to 
the SCS, the US stresses the importance of international law, as expressed in the 
implementation report on the national strategy for the Arctic (2015). Nevertheless, only in 
2016 territorial claims by Canada and Russia are first named in official policy documents and 
mentioned as conflicting with international law.  
 The outcomes for liberal institutionalism for the Arctic region are thus conflicting. On 
the one hand, institutions and international cooperation play a large role, but on the other 
hand the theory would expect the US to put more emphasis on its economic interests in the 
region.  
 
6.3 Constructivism 
To test the explanatory strengths and weaknesses of constructivism, I formulated the 
following expectation: 
 
Expectation 3: the US response to the Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the 
scramble for territory in the Arctic can be explained by a changing strategic culture in which 
the US wishes to be less involved in protecting international waterways. 
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The militarisation of the SCS 
Does the US behave as a leading super power, does it present itself as guardian of the global 
commons and does it ensure freedom of navigation? Initially, the US remained aloof to the 
disputes in the SCS and it wished not to take a position. Later, the US showed its leadership in 
the SCS by providing states in the region with military support, upon which some of them 
depend heavily and it condemned Chinese expansion and reclamation activities. Moreover, 
‘US leadership’ is a term often used in policy and strategy documents. However, the US has 
not particularly acted as a super power pushing forward its interests in a way that forces China 
to follow its lead. American action in the region has not prevented China from continuing its 
activities and claims. Since no strong US military response has followed, one could argue that 
the US hopes the dispute can be solved peacefully or that it does not attach sufficient value 
to the SCS to engage militarily. This all may indicate a US wish to be less involved in the affairs 
surrounding the SCS, although clear evidence is missing. The importance of freedom of 
navigation is emphasized in policy and strategic documents and American FONOPs and 
Carter’s statement that “The United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international 
law will allow, as we do all around the world” (Carter, 2015) reflect adherence to this norm. 
Despite this and its near-constant presence in the SCS, the US has not been willing to enforce 
freedom of navigation as costs may be high, and even though this could be an indication of a 
changing strategic culture, this policy is likely to be informed by other considerations. 
 
The scramble for the Arctic 
In contrast to what one might expect from the US, it is not actively exercising its power in the 
Arctic region and it is lagging behind other states in the region. It is important to realise that 
the Arctic region is not just any type of international water, but it is a strategically relevant 
region including US territory. Thus, besides the general idea of freedom of the seas, the Arctic 
region should also be important to the US because of direct homeland security reasons, which 
would be all the more reason to take on an assertive, leading position. However, apart from 
any possible change in the US strategic culture, the US was very late with paying attention to 
and producing policy on the Arctic, and it thus has for sure not been a leader in that sense. 
Even after the US started to make explicit policy and strategies on the Arctic, US leadership is 
was not an important part of its policies and strategic documents. Rather, it spoke almost 
exclusively of national interests, and not the role it should fulfil. Only in the strategy published 
in 2016, a commitment to leadership is expressed explicitly. Freedom of the seas is mentioned 
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as a top national priority in the Arctic policy, and by implementing the policy the US aims to 
ensure this freedom. Even though the US Navy spoke of possible FONOPs in the region, 
concrete US leadership is absent. In the Arctic, the US strongly adheres to the norm of freedom 
of navigation, but this is neither reflected in its strategic culture as safe guarder of 
international waters nor in its identity as a super power. This finding is in line with Till’s work, 
who analyses the US CS21R and finds that there is “now much less direct emphasis than there 
was in 2007 on the role of the U.S. maritime forces in contributing to the defense of the global 
sea-based trading system” (2015, p. 36). Although the intention is still present, the focus has 
moved to international cooperation for international stability and an enhanced emphasis on 
a muscular approach towards protecting US interests (Till, 2015). 
 
6.4 Conclusions congruence analysis 
Based on the congruence analysis, I can examine whether my findings are in line with the 
theory, are contradictory to the theory or go beyond the expectations based on the theory for 
each expectation. The findings of this are presented in Table 1. I find that certain elements of 
the US policy towards fit nicely with the ideas of defensive realism. In the case of the SCS, it is 
clear that the US increasingly perceives Chinese activities as a threat to US interests. The fact 
that the US has not strongly responded to these activities is thus not due to a lack of threat. 
Rather, it seems as is if it is troubled on how it should respond to these assertive Chinese 
activities. It appears that the US in unwilling to risk an escalation of the conflict to ensure it 
hegemonic position in the region. In the Arctic region, the fact that the US has been lagging 
behind shows a certain reluctance to the developments there. After all, it is now preparing for 
increased activity in the maritime and recognises that activities of other Arctic states may 
present a risk to the US homeland. Nevertheless, it seems that the US does not see the 
developments in the Arctic as existential threats to its security, since if this would be the case, 
a stronger response would be expected. Similar to the SCS, the US does not view its interests 
as important enough to risk triggering a regional conflict. 
Considering the centrality of the liberal world order in US foreign policy, the focus 
international law as an institution in many of its strategic and policy documents is not 
surprising. The impact of existing institutions and shared interests with other states is further 
clear from American statements on the importance of the Arctic Council and from the fact 
that the DoD identifies US allies and partners as the “cornerstone” of its Arctic strategy. 
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Nonetheless, liberal institutionalism would expect the US to be more proactive in pursuing its 
economic interests in the Arctic region. Two factors possibly complicate a liberal 
institutionalist explanation of the situation. The first is the fact that, although it claims to 
adhere to international law, the US is one of the only states in the world that has not ratified 
the UNCLOS. Secondly, the current President Trump is less keen on international institutions 
and focuses less on international law than did his predecessors. In documents of previous 
administrations, the importance of adherence to international law was stressed continuedly.  
The evidence for a change in the American strategic culture as possible explanation is 
mixed. In the SCS, the US was reluctant to become engaged initially, and despite its freedom 
of navigation exercises, it has proven unwilling to enforce freedom of navigation in the region. 
However, discourse on the importance of the freedom of navigation is persistent. Also, one 
should not forget that the US still has a near-constant presence in the Asia-Pacific and that it 
is still involved through support to a number of states in the region. However, in the Arctic, 
the US surely has not taken on a leadership role. On the contrary, it was very late to act at all. 
In general, it seems that nowadays there is less direct emphasis on the role of the US in the 
defence of the global sea-based trading system than there was before.  
 Based on the above analysis, it is evident that all of the theories discussed provide 
conditions and mechanism relevant for explaining US behaviour, but none of them has 
sufficient comprehensive explanatory power on its own.  
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 Observations in line with 
expectations  
Observations contradictory to 
expectations 
Observations beyond 
expectations 
Defensive 
realism 
China not contained by US 
military presence in the SCS 
but not further response from 
US 
Growth in threat perception in 
policy documents and strategic 
documents on China and 
developments in the Arctic 
Focus on the freedom of 
navigation norm 
 Late development of Arctic 
policy and lagging behind on 
other states in the region 
Military presence in SCS International cooperation 
through the Arctic Council in 
the Arctic 
  Network of strategic partners in 
the SCS 
 
  Build-up of capabilities in the 
Arctic 
 
Liberal 
institutionalism 
Emphasis on importance of 
international law 
Non-ratification of the UNCLOS Reluctance of the to pursue its 
interests in the Arctic 
 Shared interests with China 
beyond the SCS 
Conflicting interests with China 
in the SCS 
 
 International cooperation 
through the Arctic Council in 
the Arctic 
Importance of the SCS and Arctic 
region for international trade 
and commerce 
 
Constructivism US wished to not get involved 
in the SCS dispute initially 
Central role for importance of 
freedom of navigation in policy 
documents and strategies in 
both SCS and Arctic 
 
 No enforcement of freedom of 
navigation in the SCS 
Freedom of navigation and 
aviation exercises in the SCS 
 
 Wish to solve SCS conflict 
peacefully 
Support to states in the SCS  
 No leading role in the Arctic, 
late to act 
Near-constant presence in the 
SCS 
 
 Focus on national interests 
instead of overall situation and 
order in the Arctic 
  
Table 1. Findings congruence analysis  
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6.5 Synthetic perspective: theoretical complementarity  
Following from the conclusions of the congruence analysis, I suggest a synthetic perspective 
that combines different explanatory factors from the different theories discussed. It is clear 
that the US is troubled on how to halt Chinese reclamation activities without risking triggering 
an escalation of the conflict. This fits into defensive realist thinking. Although surprising, the 
slow development of Arctic policy can most logically be explained by a low threat perception 
of the developments in the Arctic. Apparently, these are not considered existential by the US 
government. However, it is clear that a defensive realist explanation alone does not suffice. 
To fully cover the causes of US behaviour, the defensive realist logic should be enriched with 
liberal institutionalists ideas. As for defensive realism, this theory alone is not able to explain 
the US behaviour, but I find that international law is an important explanatory factor for the 
US policy. The interactions between states are not only determined by their actions and threat 
perceptions but are constrained by international law. More specifically, the US aims to force 
other states to abide to this law. Thus, American policy is not only guided by their perception 
of the balance of threat but also by international law, the adherence and promotion hereof. 
This is both the case in the SCS and the Arctic and appears to be present throughout US foreign 
policy generally. In fact, for Washington, international law is a way to stabilise the anarchical 
environment that it operates in, as recognised by liberal institutionalism. The expectation 
based on constructivist theory is harder to fit into this picture. In policy documents on the 
Arctic, the focus is increasingly on US national interests, although freedom of navigation is still 
a top priority. As for the SCS, the near-constant presence in the area, the freedom of 
navigation exercises and the support for states in the region speak against a changing strategic 
culture. In order to prevent simply listing “a multitude of (more or less disconnected) reasons 
or drivers” (Kruck, 2014, p. 113) of my object of study, I do not include the possible explanatory 
variables of constructivism.  To this extent, I agree with Kruck, who finds that “different and 
largely independent explanatory factors grasp different aspects of a phenomenon under 
study” (2014, p. 132).  
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7. Conclusions 
In this paper, I aimed to uncover the theoretical causes of the American behaviour in the SCS 
and the Arctic and the role the US took on following the events there. I formulated 
expectations on the US behaviour based on defensive realism, liberal institutionalism and 
constructivism, the three major streams in international relations. I empirically analysed policy 
documents and actions to assess the explanatory strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
theories. As none of the theories is able to offer an inclusive explanation for the US policy and 
behaviour, I used a synthetic perspective to combine explanatory factors from different 
theories to arrive at a comprehensive explanation for the US behaviour in the two cases.  
 
7.1 Answer to the research question 
The research question of this paper is:  
 
If the US wants to maintain its unique position, why has it been reluctant to address the 
Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea and the scramble for territory in the Arctic? 
 
US reluctance to address Chinese militarisation of the SCS and the scramble for territory in the 
Arctic can be explained using a combination of defensive realist and liberal institutionalist 
frameworks. Both theories have explanatory strengths as well as blind spots, and combining 
certain explanatory factors allows me to draw a comprehensive conclusion. Growing power 
of other states in both the SCS and the Arctic increase the costs for the US to maintain its 
hegemony and come with rising risks of escalating conflicts. The developments in the SCS and 
the Arctic are currently not seen as existential threats to national security by the US 
government and Washington is thus not willing to risk an escalating conflict to ensure its 
position in the two regions. However, American behaviour is also informed by the liberal 
institutionalist concept of international law, which the US uses to navigate through the 
anarchic environment and to stabilise the balance of threat.  
 
7.2 Discussion of findings 
Studying the role of the US in the SCS and the Arctic is of great relevance as it covers the 
behaviour of the world’s greatest power in two highly significant regions, both economic and 
strategic. What happens in those regions may have an impact on, and alter, the division of 
power in the world in the years to come. For a start, the US has to deal with the knowledge 
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that the Asia-Pacific will no longer be an arena of American hegemony. Moreover, it has to 
refocus towards the Arctic as strategic interests in this region will grow with the diminishing 
of sea ice. The fact that the US has not taken on an assertive, leading role in the Arctic is 
especially surprising as the Arctic is a strategically important region with US territory. It would 
be relevant to gain further insights on how the US deals with this. Moreover, if the trend of 
focusing on US interests rather than on being the guardian of the global commons, as 
identified in the Arctic, continues and spreads to other regions, this will have an impact on 
future international affairs. Another term of President Trump and his ‘America First’ approach 
would only strengthen this tendency. 
 A possible limitation of this specific research is the fact that the timeframes 
chosen for my case studies cover multiple US administrations that do not necessarily make 
choices similar to the administration before them and may each have their own reasons for 
acting in the way they do. Thus, despite the continuity that exists in American foreign policy 
due to the so-called deep state, it may be a risk to group together different administrations 
and argue that they have similar ideas, preferences and perceptions of events in the world. 
Moreover, the timeframes of the two case studies are not perfectly aligned, as this is not the 
case for events in the SCS and the Arctic region.  
Conducting this study based on the idea of analytic eclecticism fits into a larger 
movement within social science, based on the recognition that the world may be too complex 
to be explained by single theoretical models (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010). Even though the policies 
of the US in the SCS and the Arctic are widely studied, this research fills a gap in the existing 
literature by using a synthetic perspective to see how multiple theories can work 
complementary to explain actual behaviour of the US. Future research may want to focus on 
a more in-depth analysis of US behaviour to further advance the theoretical debate on how 
theories can be complementary rather than rival. Additionally, it may want to empirically test 
the conclusions drawn in this and other papers that apply a synthetic perspective to 
international relations.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
44 
Bibliography 
Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. European Journal of 
International Relations, 3(3), 319-363.  
Al Jazeera (2019, November 4). US envoy decries Chinese 'intimidation' in South China Sea. Retrieved 
on 14 November 2019 from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/11/envoy-decries-
chinese-intimidation-south-china-sea-191104050635259.html  
 
Altunkaya, E. (2019). US and the Arctic region in the era of climate change: A brief analysis of the 
evolution of US Arctic foreign policy since 2000s. Istanbul Gelişim Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler 
Dergisi, 6(1), 183-199. 
 
Birdwell, I. (2016, August 15). Rival claims to a changing Arctic. The Maritime Executive. Retrieved on 
9 September 2019 from: https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/rival-claims-to-the-
changing-arctic  
Blatter, J., & Haverland, M. (2012). Congruence analysis. Designing case studies (pp. 144-204) Springer. 
Bouchat, C. J. (2014). The Paracel Islands and US Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea. U.S. 
Army War College. Retrieved on 7 September 2019 from: 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a603627.pdf  
Cai, P. (2017). The South China Sea: Troubled waters in China-US relations. China Quarterly of 
International Strategic Studies, 3(02), 283-298. 
 
Carter, A. (2015). IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: “A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises”. 
Department of Defense. Retrieved on 22 October 2019 from:  
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/606676/  
 
Chen, S. (2015, March). U.S. Navy Urges Southeast Asian Patrols of South China Sea. Bloomberg. 
Retrieved on 4 October 2019 from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-18/u-
s-navy-urges-joint-southeast-asia-patrols-of-south-china-sea  
Chivers, C. J. (2007, August). Russians Plant Flag on the Arctic Seabed. The New York Times. Retrieved 
on 9 October 2019 from: https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/world/europe/03arctic.html 
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics, 44(4), 823-830.  
Conley, H., & Kraut, J. (2010). US strategic interests in the Arctic. Center for Strategic & International 
Studies. 
 
Dantzler, H. (2016). United States Naval Strategy in the South China Sea to Ensure International 
Freedom of Navigation. Retrieved on 7 September 2019 from: 
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1037673  
De Castro, R. (2015). The Philippines confronts China in the South China Sea: Power politics vs. 
liberalism-legalism. Asian Perspective, 39(1), 71-100.  
Department of Defense. (2013). Arctic Strategy. Retrieved on 17 October 2019 from: 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2013_Arctic_Strategy.pdf  
 
 
45 
Department of Defense. (2015). Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. Retrieved on 17 October 2019 
from: https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-
P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF  
Department of Defense. (2016). Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National 
Security Interests in the Arctic Region. Retrieved on 17 October 2019 from: 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-
for-release.pdf  
Department of Defense. (2018). Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States 
of America. Retrieved on 11 October 2019 from: 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf  
Department of State (no date). U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Retrieved on 22 October 2019 
from: https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair//index.htm  
Department of the Navy. (2015) A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Retrieved on 11 
October 2019 from: https://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf  
 
Executive Office of the President of the United States. (2016). Implementation framework National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region. Retrieved on 17 October 2019 from: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/National%20St
rategy%20for%20the%20Arctic%20Region%20Implementation%20Framework%20(Appendix%
20A)%20Final.pdf  
 
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International 
Organization, 52(4), 887-917. 
Forsberg, T. (1996). Explaining territorial disputes: From power politics to normative reasons. Journal 
of Peace Research, 33(4), 433-449. 
Fravel, T. (2016). US policy towards the disputes in the South China Sea since 1995. Power politics in 
Asia’s contested waters (pp. 389-402) Springer. 
Friedberg, A. L. (2005). The future of US-China relations: Is conflict inevitable? International 
Security, 30(2), 7-45.  
Gao, Z. (1994). The South China Sea: From conflict to cooperation? Ocean Development & International 
Law, 25(3), 345-359.  
Gompert, D. C. (2013). Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND Corporation. 
Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), 485-507.  
Hellmann, G., & Wolf, R. (1993). Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and the future of 
NATO. Security Studies, 3(1), 3-43. 
 
 
46 
Heywood, A. (2015). Key concepts in politics and international relations. Macmillan International 
Higher Education. 
Hong, N. (2012). The melting Arctic and its impact on China’s maritime transport. Research in 
Transportation Economics, 35(1), 50-57. 
Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. International 
Security, 23(1), 171-200.  
Hossain, K., & Barala, H. (2017). An assessment of US chairmanship of the arctic council. Arctic Centre 
University of Lapland. Retrieved on 22 October 2019 from: 
https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/62823/Assessment-of-US-Arctic-Council-
Chairmanship-ArCticles-2017-2.pdf?sequence=5  
 
Huebert, R. (2009). United states Arctic policy: The reluctant Arctic power. University of Calgary, the 
School of Public Policy–University of Calgary Publications Series, 2(2). 
Ikenberry, G. J. (2017). The plot against American foreign policy: Can the liberal order survive. Foreign 
Aff., 96, 2. 
Jackson, R., Sørensen, G., & Møller, J. (2016). Introduction to international relations: Theories and 
approaches.  Oxford University Press, USA. 
Kaplan, R. D. (2018, October 9). How President Trump is helping China win in the South China Sea. The 
Washington Post. Retrieved on 15 November 2019 from: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/10/09/how-president-
trump-is-helping-beijing-win-in-the-south-china-sea/  
Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. International 
Security, 20(1), 39-51.  
Konyshev, V., & Sergunin, A. (2012). The Arctic at the crossroads of geopolitical interests. Russian 
Politics & Law, 50(2), 34-54. 
Kruck, A. (2014). Theorising the use of private military and security companies: A synthetic perspective. 
Journal of International Relations and Development, 17(1), 112-141. 
Lajeunesse, A., & Huebert, R. (2019). Preparing for the next Arctic sovereignty crisis: The northwest 
passage in the age of Donald Trump. International Journal, 74(2), 225-239. 
 
Landler (2010, July 23). Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. challenges China on disputed islands. The New York 
Times. Retrieved on 13 December 2018 from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html  
Lendon, B. (2019, May). Rival South China Sea vision in spotlight as Washington, Beijing front Shangri-
La Dialogue. CNN. Retrieved on 23 October 2019 from: 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/30/asia/us-south-china-sea-shangri-la-intl/index.html  
Loomba, A. (2007). Colonialism/postcolonialism. Routledge: London. 
 
 
47 
Hoskin, M. (2019). Historical support for China’s South China Sea territorial stance. Maritime Executive. 
Retrieved on 7 December 2019 from: https://www.maritime-
executive.com/editorials/historical-support-for-china-s-south-china-sea-territorial-stance-1  
 
McDevitt, M. (2014). The South China Sea: Assessing US policy and options for the future. CNA 
Occasional Paper, 1-92. 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2007). Structural realism. International Relations Theories: Discipline and 
Diversity, 83 
Miller, J. C. (2016). The Arctic: America's oldest and coldest new frontier. US Army War College. 
 
NBC News. (2007, August). Russia defends North Pole flag-planting. Retrieved on 4 October 2019 from:  
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/20169307/ns/world_news-world_environment/t/russia-
defends-north-pole-flag-planting/#.XepgjS1x_Vp  
 
Noyes, J. E. (2005). The United States, the Law of the Sea Convention, and freedom of navigation. 
Suffolk Transnat'l L.Rev., 29, 1. 
 
O'Rourke, R. (2014). Maritime territorial and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) disputes involving China: 
Issues for congress. Retrieved on 4 October 2019 from: 
https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA604215  
 
Pezard, S. (2018). The new geopolitics of the Arctic. RAND Corporation. Retrieved on 11 October 2019 
from: 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT500/RAND_CT500.pdf  
 
Pompeo, M. R. Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus. Department of Defense. Retrieved 
on 22 October 2019 from:  https://www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-
focus/  
 
Potts, T., & Schofield, C. (2008). Current Legal Developments: the Arctic. International Journal of 
Marine & Coastal Law, 23, 151. 
 
Repkina, A. (2015). Arctic Territories. Eurasian Business Briefing. Retrieved on 7 December 2019 from: 
https://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/russia-renews-claims-to-arctic-territories/arctic-
territories/  
 
Robbin, D. (2011). Arctic defense concerns reorganizing US defense structure to meet threats in the 
changing Arctic. Arctic, 2011, 04-22. 
 
Roston, E. & Migliozzi, B. (2017, May) How a Melting Arctic Changes Everything. Part II: The Political 
Arctic. Bloomberg. Retrieved on 4 October 2019 from:  
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-arctic/the-political-arctic/  
Rustandi, C. A. (2016). The South China Sea dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to enhance its policies in 
order to achieve resolution. Canberra: Center for Defence and Strategic Studies. 
Shea, N. & Palu, L. (2019, May 8). Scenes from the new cold war unfolding at the top of the world. 
National Geographic. Retrieved on 9 September 2019 from: 
 
 
48 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/10/new-cold-war-brews-as-arctic-
ice-melts/ 
Shear, D. (2015). Statement of David Shear, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security 
Affairs before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 11 October 2019 from: 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051315_Shear_Testimony.pdf  
Sil, R., & Katzenstein, P. J. (2010). Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: Reconfiguring 
problems and mechanisms across research traditions. Perspectives on Politics, 8(2), 411-431. 
Sinkler, A. (2011). Retroduction, congruence analysis, and causal inference in case study 
research. Congruence Analysis, and Causal Inference in Case Study Research (March 25, 2011). 
Retrieved on 13 December 2018 from: 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=05300210400207211600900501808808112505
1050049050065025125085064031073107010007082110057117049061018023008101019094
0070120001100160120370130930141180990691081030730370390430090890671051091241
23101026118118113006126116096075116010007121029073104127029&EXT=pdf  
Stein, A. (2008). Neoliberal institutionalism. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, 201-221.  
The President (2015). Enhancing coordination of national efforts in the Arctic. Presidential Documents. 
Retrieved on 11 October 2019 from: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-national-efforts-arctic  
The White House. (2009).  National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66) and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD-25). Retrieved on 4 October 2019 from: 
http://polarconnection.org/national-security-presidential-directive-66homeland-security-
presidential-directive-25-january-2009/   
The White House. (2013). National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Retrieved on 17 October 2019 from: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf  
The White House. (2015). National Security Strategy. Retrieved on 11 October 2019 from: 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strat
egy_2.pdf  
The White House. (2015). National strategy for the Arctic region implementation report. Retrieved on 
17 October 2019 from: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=764770  
The White House. (2017). National Security Strategy. Retrieved on 11 October 2019 from: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf  
Toje, A. (2009). Strategic culture as an analytic tool. Western Balkans Security Observer-English 
Edition, (14), 3-23. 
Turner, S. (2009). Russia, China and a multipolar world order: The danger in the undefined. Asian 
Perspective, 159-184.  
Valencia (2017, June 24). Trump’s South China Sea policy taking shape. The Globalist. Retrieved on 15 
November 2019 from: https://www.theglobalist.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/0624p07.pdf   
 
 
49 
Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural realism after the cold war. International Security, 25(1), 5-41.  
Weiss, T. G., & Wilkinson, R. (2014). Global governance to the rescue: Saving international 
relations? Global Governance, 20(1), 19-36.  
Xiaohui, S. (2018). Dynamics of the Trump administration's policy on the South China Sea. China Int'l 
Stud., 69, 168. 
Yahuda, M. (2013). China's new assertiveness in the South China Sea. Journal of Contemporary 
China, 22(81), 446-459.  
Yoon, S. (2017). Why is China militarising the South China Sea? The South China Sea disputes: 
Flashpoints, turning points and trajectories (pp. 311-314) World Scientific. 
  
